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Assessing the Legacy of Communism: 
Continuities and Discontinuities in the East-Central 
European Transitions III
Abstract
Based on six national representative surveys conducted in Hungary in 
between 1977 and 1997 using the Rokeach value test, this article tries to assess 
the extent to which the communist period left a 'stamp' on the preferences of 
basic human values. The results show that classical socialist values like 
EQUALITY, WORK and SOCIAL RECOGNITION decisively lost ground 
after 1989, while the group of collective security values considered as the 
official values of the communist regime (NATIONAL SECURITY, WORLD 
AT PEACE), though regained importance by 1993, receded again by 1996 at 
the latest. However, apart from the growth of importance by the values 
directly opposed to these two groups of socialist values, according to our data 
no coherent new value group emerged after 1989 that could give direction 
and cohesion to the new socio-political order.






















































































































































































The momentous changes of 1989 almost immediately posed two questions 
that the social science literature concerned does not cease to return to since. 
How come that the voluminous literature on communist regimes failed to 
predict the radicality and suddenness of these changes (Lipset and Bence 
1994)? And how come that once the communist regimes collapsed and the 
Red Army retired to Russia, the legacy of the Communist Party keeps 
haunting almost all the countries that, so it was thought, were finally 
liberated from its spell (Holmes 1997, Horvath and Szakolczai 1992, Janos 
1994, Mokrzycki 1992, Neumann 1996, Schopflin 1993, Tismaneanu 1992, 
Verdery 1996)? The two questions are closely related, forming a tight 
paradox. How a radical and unforeseen change could have happened, asks 
the first. And how is it in the midst of all those changes, so many things 
remained the same, asks the second.
This combination of discontinuity and continuity helped first to 
partially answer and then to reformulate one of the most vexing problems 
concerning these regimes, the extent to which the communist ideology and 
politics succeeded to indoctrinate the populace under its grip. According to 
the heroic stories, based on the 1956 of Budapest, the 1968 of Prague or the 
1980 of Gdansk, the self-organising civil society' fiercely resisted the onslaught 
of the state and the Party, and raised its voice whenever it got a chance. (1) 
However, this account was opposed and contested from another side, by 
intellectuals, poets and analysts who claimed, almost since the establishment 
of the regimes, that far from being simpiy an external dictatorship, 
communism managed to transform in depth the countries it took control of.
(2)
On a first look, the fact and the character of the changes seemed to 
refute definitely the picture of the homo sovieticus’ (Zinoviev 1981). 
However, the everpresence of the lasting legacy of the past suggests a 
somewhat different scenario. The paradox concerning the success or failure of 
communist impregnation keeps haunting the present, just as it did the past.
However, if a problem cannot be solved, the reason may be that the 
question was badly posed. In such cases, the solution is not to be gained by a 
synthesis of the different suggestions but through a reformulation of the 
problem or the question. In the case of the impact of communism, this lies 
through a differentiation between the direct, manifest and indirect, latent 



























































































regime on its own terms, a spontaneous, from below reproduction of existing 
socialism, an Orwellian love of Big Brother. The events of the past decade 
demonstrated beyond doubt that this did not happen. However, the lasting 
legacy can be shown to exist on another, less accessible, more latent, but 
nevertheless just as real level: not in ideologies and explicit goals, but in 
mentalities; not in the content but the form and modality of behaviour; not in 
concrete, formal institutions and organisations but in attitudes and values 
related to institutions and the very process of institutionalisation.
A distinction between the manifest and the hidden is relatively easy to 
make as a matter of principle. It can also rely upon the support of a long 
intellectual tradition, particularly present in German philosophical idealism, 
in the opposition of the hidden essence to the mere surface of phenomena. 
This paper, however, would use as a reference point a quite different type of 
literature: the emphasis in phenomenological sociology, and related 
approaches, on the taken for granted (Schütz 1962), the frame (Goffman 1986, 
Bateson 1972), or the background (Gadamer 1975, Searle 1992: 175). In these 
approaches, the unseen is not the hidden essence, only the aspect of 
behaviour - sometimes its most trivial aspect - that is not visible due to its 
very closeness and familiarity. In this perspective, the hidden and lasting 
legacy of the former regime concerns not something related to the essence of 
communist ideology of organisation, but the boring, trivial, routine aspects of 
behaviour that to its practitioners is taken for granted as given, evident, 
matter of fact, natural and universal, part of the way things have to be done, 
and by no means connected to the specific legacy of communism.
Such a perspective also helps to connect values to actual, regular 
everyday practices, the conduct of life.
On values
It is widely agreed that the legacy of the past is particularly strong at the level 
of political culture, intellectual traditions, ingrained mentalities; in one word, 
at the level of values (Schopflin 1993, Kennedy 1994). It is therefore not 
surprising that the question of the failure or success of communist 
indoctrination was at the centre of those empirical studies that tried to map 
the social value system in the post-communist countries after 1989.
Such studies can be divided into two broad groups. One is focusing on 
political culture and political values, and is especially interested in the 



























































































democratic transformation after decades of communist rule (Bruszt and 
Simon 1992, Miller et ak 1997, Reisinger et af 1994, Simon 1995). The other has 
a more general orientation, targeting basic human values (Bardi and Schwartz 
1996, Broek and Moor 1993, Schwartz and Bardi 1997). However, both 
approaches share two common dilemmas, related to the assessment of the 
communist legacy. One is theoretical, and is concerned with the proper 
conceptualisation of the lasting legacy of the past regime. The question is the 
identification of the exact level in which the survivals of the past are 
supposed the lie. The empirical dilemma is posed by the lack of longitudinal 
data (Schwartz and Bardi 1997: 385). This paper intends to alleviate both 
dilemmas by presenting a theoretical framework for the study of survivals at 
the level of values that effectively guide behaviour, and by presenting results 
from an empirical study of values, using data from six representative national 
surveys done in Hungary between 1977 and 1997. (3)
As the theoretical underpinning of an empirical study of individual 
values, the paper will rely upon Max Weber's sociology of religions, 
especially his 1915 'Introduction' to the first published essays. (4)
In the classical paradigms of value sociology, values either exist as 
overarching and binding social norms, located at the level of the collectivity 
and not amenable to micro-level individual analysis (this idea goes back at 
least to Parsons 1968), or they are assumed to reside in basic individual needs, 
and are universal for every human being (the classic statement of this view is 
by Maslow 1959). The Weberian argument is opposed to both positions. 
According to it, values are to be studied at the level of individuals, and not 
collective entities. They are related to the manner in which individuals 
actually conduct their life (Lebensfiihriing). However, this is not due to a prior 
positive or normative assumption, characteristic of methodological 
individualism, but is related to an empirical fact, even urgency. The conduct 
of life only becomes connected to values once the formerly taken for granted 
forms of behaviour become problematic.
Such a phenomenon becomes socially relevant if it occurs at the same 
time for a number of individuals. This happens in rare moments when the 
existing order of things is dissolved (Voegelin 1978: 89-115), in moments of 
transition (Borkenau 1976, Elias 1983, 1994), or in suspended or 'liminal' 
periods (van Gennep 1960, Victor Turner 1967, 1969). As in such periods the 
stable reference points break down, individuals are left on their own to 
provide stability and guidance to their own life. The different value orders of 




























































































268-80, Elias 1983: 39-40) of such moments of dislocation. In the words of 
Weber, "[n]ot ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's 
conduct. Yet very frequently the 'world images' that have been created bv 
ideas’ have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has 
been pushed by the dynamic of interest." (Weber 194S: 280).
The suspension of order, or the liminal' condition, however, does not 
merely stamp' the individuals who suffer the pains and pressures of such 
periods. Quite the contrary, these force individuals to take a step back from 
their routine activities, stimulating the work of thought, or reflexivity (Elias 
1987, Bourdieu 1990, Voegelin 1978: 11-2). Under highly fluid and instable 
periods of transition, the work of thought is not restricted to the reflection of 
existing social or political structures in ideas or representations — as such 
stable structures were already suspended; rather it is the reflexive activity of 
thought that contributes to the stamping of those structures and identities, 
both mental and institutional, social and individual, that eventually would 
become the repository of order and become taken for granted — until further 
notice.
Values, therefore, are not identical to (supra-individual) norms, the 
consensual principles widely shared in a given society. Neither are they 
rooted in (sub-individual) needs, the biological or physiological urges that are 
shared by all human beings. They are rather related to the way individuals 
conduct their life, being effective maxims guiding behaviour that become 
accessible once they are problematised again through the reflexive work of 
thought.
Values understood in this sense can be analysed at the individual level, 
even through sociological surveys. However, this requires the use of a special, 
reflexive approach that is not usually applied in opinion polls. Surveys are 
interested either in actual behaviour (where the question is whether the 
respondent reports truthfully what s/he has done), or in attitudes (where the 
information is merely a sudden reaction to a quick impulse). Surveys are not 
interested in posing questions to respondents for which they need to pause 
and reflect for some minutes to answer. Such an approach is ruled out by 
simple considerations of cost.
There is, however, a value test that was specifically developed for an 
in-depth, reflexive analysis of individual values. It was worked out by the 
Polish-born American social psychologists, Milton Rokeach. Based on years of 
clinical experimentation, Rokeach (1973) developed a set of 18 terminal and 



























































































values (see Appendix). Rokeach had an explicitly reflexive orientation. He 
asked respondents to rank from 1 to IS both sets of values, comparing and 
contrasting, in principle, each and every pair of values. As a result, the filling 
out of this test requires at least 15-20 minutes per respondents, making its 
costs all but prohibitive for ordinary survey research. However, it is widely 
acknowdedged that the Rokeach test is a particularly sensitive and reliable 
instrument to map in depth the core values held by individuals (Feather 1975, 
Feldman 1988, Schwarz 1994). (5)
Data and methods
The Rokeach test was asked on fully representative national samples by the 
Centre for Value Sociology at the Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences, led by Elemer Hankiss, in 1977-8, 1982, 1990, 1993, 1996 and 1997. 
The samples sizes were 807, 2938, 1320, 1538, 1500 and 1500, w'hile those 
filling out the test correctly were 677, 2089, 1063, 1150, 1327 and 1347, 
respectively. In this paper, we will focus on changes in the average 
preferences for the different values by the whole population, using two-tailed 
t-tests and analysis of variance.
Background information
In order to facilitate the interpretation of simultaneous changes in a set of 36 
values covering a span of 20 years, three sets of additional information will be 
given here, relying on previous studies and other type of data analyses. They 
have a semantic, social and systemic character.
Semantic information
Though the aim of Rokeach was to develop two sets of 18 values that are 
independent in meaning from each other and that cover the entire value span, 
it is clear that the meaning of some is closer than of others, while certain 
values stand opposed to each other. These similarities and differences can be 
analysed by the use of multivariate statistical methods like factor analysis. 
Such studies reveal, for example, an intimate connection between a series of 
ideological values like PEACE, NATIONAL SECURITY, FREEDOM and 
EQUALITY, and their opposition to such materialistic or hedonistic values 



























































































both substance and method, Table 1 contains the relevant factor loadings of 
the first principal component for the six Hungarian observation years, and 
also for the American data. The first principal component can be best 
conceived of as the main cleavage dividing the value system of a given 
society.
Social information
The meaning of values, and especially their preference, also has a strong 
social component. There is a difference between preferences according to age, 
gender, occupation, and especially education. We also analysed special sub­
samples like university students, managers, people educated at special 
communist party schools, or gipsies. These studies add a further perspective 
to the interpretation of changes in the overall preference for certain values. 
For example, the extremely strong preference for PEACE and NATIONAL 
SECURITY by those educated at special Communist party schools identified 
these values as the core of the official socialist values (Szakolczai 1987), while 
WORK, SOCIAL RECOGNITION and SELF-RESPECT are rather the classical 
socialist or social-democratic values that had a close semantic affinity, 
according to the results of factor analysis, and are preferred mostly by male 
skilled workers.
Systemic information
Apart from identifying certain values with their carrier strata' (Weber 1948), a 
contrast between the Hungarian results of 1977-78 and the American data for 
1968, and also between the respective factor structures, helps to identify some 
of the peculiarities of the Hungarian value preferences (see Figures 1 and 2).
1. In Hungary, it was possible to distinguish the presence of a value order that 
did not appear in the American sample: a 'classical' socialist or social 
democratic value order, centering upon the three values of SOCIAL 
RECOGNITION, WORK, and SELF-RESPECT. These values formed a 
separate factor in Hungary, while no comparable factor existed in the US. 



























































































average much more important in Hungary than in the US. This was not true 
for SELF-RESPECT which in the States had a different contextual meaning.
2. However, this was not the sole, not even the major specific value order in 
Hungary that deserved the 'socialist' label. Another compact set of values, 
consisting of NATIONAL SECURITY, PEACE, EQUALITY, and FREEDOM, 
could be called, in distinction to the previous, classical socialist values, the 
'official' or ideological' socialist values. These were the values, especially the 
first two, that left a particularly strong mark on value preferences in the 
Hungarian sample. This is reflected first in population averages. PEACE was 
by far the most important value in Hungary in 1977-78, and NATIONAL 
SECURITY was almost four points higher on average in Hungary than in the 
US. As it was mentioned above, the source of this emphasis can safely be 
located in the communist party apparatus.
The two values of PEACE and NATIONAL SECURITY also had a 
singular importance in the structure of value preferences, being present in the 
first two principal components, and in three of the five rotated factors. Both 
these findings have their relevance. The first two principal components, 
reflecting the major value cleavages within the sample, contained both 
terminal and instrumental values, indicating that these were the ideological, 
official socialist values that connected ends and means at the level of social 
consciousness. The large role of these values in defining the rotated factor 
structure, on the other hand, indicates the everpresence of ideological 
considerations even in the finer divisions in the structure of the value system.
3. Apart from the two different socialist value orders, there was another 
group of values much more preferred by Hungarians than Americans. These 
were the intellectual values (INTELLECTUAL, IMAGINATIVE, and 
LOGICAL). These are at the bottom of the ranking of instrumental values in 
the States, while in Hungary, they are much more preferred, by 2.5 to 4 points 
on the average. This finding reinforces views that stressed the strongly 
intellectual character of the former socialist systems (Bauman 1987, Konrad 
and Szelenyi 1979). Such a link between intellectual values and ideology is 
also supported by the fact that the first unrotated factor, defining the most 
important division of the social value system, contained these two value 




























































































4. Opposed to the official socialist value order, as represented by one pole of 
the second rotated factor in 1977-78, there is a mixed set of values: FAMILY, 
LOVE, LOVING, HAPPINESS, INNER HARMONY, and WELL-BEING. 
These values in general belong to quite different value orders, correlation 
among them being not particularly strong. Thus, LOVE is strongly correlated 
with FRIENDSHIP, WELL-BEING with PLEASURE, INNER HARMONY 
with WISDOM, LOVING with FORGIVING. Yet, this factor contains only one 
member of these pairs. The only common characteristics uniting them is 
negative: they all belong to the private shere and are opposed to the official 
socialist values of the public sphere. As opposed a rigid, ideological 
orientation, they emphasize human relations and emotions (LOVE, LOVING, 
HAPPINESS), a turn to small community (FAMILY), to the inner side of 
personality (INNER FLARMONY), or to material comforts (WELL-BEING).
Perhaps due to this extra emphasis, these values in general are more 
important in Hungary than in the US. This is even more true if contrasted 
with their "twin" values. Thus, WELL-BEING and HAPPINESS are about 1.5 
ranking points ahead in Hungary, INNER HARMONY and LOVE by two 
points, while FRIENDSHIP is at the same level, and WISDOM a full six points 
behind. LOVING, the only member of the group preferred more in the US, is 
two and a half points behind in Hungary, while its pair, FORGIVING is four 
and a half points.
Of these, according to the contrast between the preferences of 
respondents with or without party membership in 1977-78, LOVE, FAMILY 
and INNER HARMONY can be most identified as dissident' values 
(Szakolczai 1987).
5. The largest difference between Hungary and the US is, not surprisingly, in 
religious values. SALVATION is one of the highest ranked terminal values in 
the States, while it is by far the last in Hungary, the difference being a full 
nine points in medians. There is a similar difference in the two instrumental 
values already mentioned above, LOVING and especially FORGIVING. It is 
important to note here that these values are not strictly religious, but are in 
general related to concrete interpersonal relations, communal life. The very 
low preference accorded to them in Hungary indicates not only a lack of 
religiosity, but also a lack of attention given to such considerations. This 
reading is all the more plausible as these two instrumental values, in both 




























































































6. The final contrast concerns the pragmatic values. Whether belonging 
semantically to the intellectual values (like CAPABLE), or the materialist 
values (like AMBITION), these were ranked considerably higher in the 
American sample.
These results provides us with a sharp initial picture. In Hungary, there is on 
the one hand a strong preference for ideological values and a downplaying of 
religion; on the other, a marked emphasis on intellectualisation at the expense 
of its conceptual counterpart, the values of sociability and interpersonal 
relations. Both the ideologisation and the intellectualisation are coupled with 
a relative absence of pragmatism. The question concerns extent to which these 
patterns were changing after 1989.
General hypotheses
The central assertion this paper wants to test is that communism exerted a 
very substantive and lasting, though mostly indirect, latent, hidden impact on 
society, and on value preferences. This claim can first be translated into two 
negative claims. One is that there was no comprehensive and basic reversal at 
the level of individual value preferences towards the elimination of the 
fundamental difference with respect to the pattern exhibited by the 1968 
American values. Some of the outstanding peculiarities of the values 
preferences of Hungary as manifested in the late 1970s would therefore 
persist in the mid-1990s as well. The other assertion, however, is that there 
were nevertheless significant dislocations at the level of value preferences as 
compared to the communist period, refuting any substantive continuity, 
especially in so far as the most exposed socialist or communist values are 
concerned.
These claims in themselves only assert a combination of continuities 
and discontinuities before and after 1989 that in itself w’ould be a fairly trivial 
idea. They will therefore be complemented with a second set of more positive 
general hypotheses. They will be related to the clarification of the distinction 
between direct vs. indirect, or manifest vs. latent diferences. First, it will be 
argued that changes will be greater concerning the terminal than the 
instrumental values. Terminal values are explicitly stated life-goals, while 
instrumental values are related to the modality of action and behaviour. 
Terminal values have a higher degree of visibility and immediacy, are closer 



























































































ingrained habits, the modality of the conduct of life (Mumford 1952, Weber 
1995) or the habitus (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, Elias 1991). It will 
therefore be assumed that 1989 would hardly represent a major dislocation 
concerning the instrumental values, while there would be much more basic 
changes in the average preference of terminal values.
We would expect, however, considerable differences among the 
terminal values as well, and first of all again along the same dimension of 
latency and immediacy, concerning now the relationship to the established 
socialist or communist values. Thus, as a second general hypothesis, we assert 
that in the average preference for those values that clearly and substantively 
were committed to the classical socialist ideology, there would be a radical 
difference between all pre- and the post-1989 data. The third general 
hypothesis concerns the temporary nostalgia characteristic of the years 1993- 
94, marked by the spectacular electoral victories of the post-communist 
parties in elections dominated by economic issues (Fitzmaurice 1995, Szel^nyi 
et al. 1997, Tworzecki 1994). It will be assumed that this swing of mood 
should be reflected in changes in the preference for those values that were 
most closely associated with a general feeling of support or opposition with 
the communist regime. Finally, fourth, it will be assumed that after 1989, 
apart from a general trend towards materialism and hedonism, the data 
would confirm the common w'isdom that no new' political ideas emerged in 
the region after 1989 (Vachudova and Snyder 1997:1) and that there is no sign 
of a consistent, coherent new value system that would represent a significant 
reversal and renewal as compared to the previous patterns of value 
preferences. Furthermore, it will be assumed that the increase of materialism 
in terminal values will not be correlated with a similar increase in the 
preference for pragmatic instrumental values.
Operationalised hypotheses
On the basis of these general theoretical considerations, a set of 10 hypotheses 
will now be formulated that break down these broad concerns into concrete 
suggestions related to change in the preferences for the different value 
groups, or even individual values.
Hypothesis 1. Concerning the classical socialist values, the hypothesis is 
simple: there must be a radical and irreversible break in the average 




























































































three of the social democratic values, but especially by WORK and SOCIAL 
RECOGNITION; while among the ideological values, the same must be true 
for EQUALITY that is semantically closest to this group.
Hypothesis 2. We also expect the official socialist values, especially the most 
exposed values PEACE and NATIONAL SECURITY, to lose importance. 
This, however, should manifest a different pattern. In between 1982 and 1990, 
the break should be similar to that of the classical socialist values, though 
perhaps less steep. Between 1990 and 1993, however, we expect a significant 
reversal that could even amount to a return to the pre-1990 level. By 1996, 
however, the post-communist bandwagon, according to all signs, has ended 
in Hungary, just as in the other countries of the regions, as the heirs of the 
former communist parties also lost their innocence in the new system. Thus, 
by 1996, we expect a basic return to the 1990 levels, and it should be 
maintained in 1997 as well.
Hypothesis 3. We would expect that the exact same pattern would be 
exhibited, though in the opposite direction, by the loose agglomerate of 
dissident values. Thus, preference for the values FAMILY, INNER 
HARMONY and LOVE should increse considerably in 1990, decrease again in 
1993, while increase again in 1996 and keep level in 1997.
Hypothesis 4. Concerning the projected rise in materialism and hedonism, we 
shall assume in line with our fourth general hypothesis that the terminal 
values related to material comfort, PLEASURE and especially WELL-BEING, 
will considerably gain importance after 1989. However, we do not foresee a 
similar gain in the average preferences for the semantically related pragmatic 
value of AMBITIOUS. As for the hedonistic values like HAPPINESS, 
EXCITING LIFE and CHEERFUL, we expect roughly similar changes as those 
happening with the materialist values, also due to the semantic closeness 
between the two sets.
Hypothesis 5. One of the most striking contrasts between the 1977-78 
Hungarian and the 1968 American value choices was in the preferences for 
intellectual values. Though one could argue that such a huge difference 
should have been attenuated after the changes, especially as the importance 
of the educated elite and of the written word, so characteristic of the former 




























































































with the assumption concerning the continuity at the level of habitus', the 
instrumental values. We also formulate two further, minor hypotheses 
concerning the intellectual values. One is related to the strong ties between 
the official socialist and the intellectual values, due to the stamping effect' of 
the former regime. Thus, given the post-communist nostalgia, one could even 
expect a relative increase in the preference for intellectual values in 1993. 
Second, we do not expect similar changes in the semantically related 
pragmatic value, CAPABLE.
Hypothesis 6. The greatest, though not at all surprising, difference between 
the Hungarian and American value preferences concerned the religious 
values. As it is well-known, there was little increase in religiosity in Hungary' 
after 1989, in spite of the efforts of the first post-1989 government. Such a 
finding also follows from our fourth general hypothesis, according to which 
materialism and hedonism are the only new developments in values after 
1989. We would therefore expect at most a mild increase in the average 
preference of SALVATION, with a perceivable drop around the year 1993.
Hypothesis 7. We expect, however, a distinctly different pattern to be shown 
by a semantically very close group of instrumental values, those 
encompassing interpersonal relations and community life. Apart from 
FORGIVING, values like LOVING and HELPFUL belong here, that are 
semantically opposite to the intellectual values. These characteristics were 
much more appreciated in the United States, except for HELPFUL that, with 
its socialist-collectivist connotations, was more important in Hungary. In light 
of our general hypotheses, we expect no increase in the average preference for 
these values in Hungary after 1989. Quite the contrary, it is assumed, in light 
of projected loss of substantive socialist values, that even HELPFUL would 
lose its relative edge in Hungary.
Hypothesis 8. The other group of instrumental values opposed semantically 
to the intellectual values are the traditional-disciplinary values of OBEDIENT, 
CLEAN and POLITE. These values have much less substantive content than 
the interpersonal and community values. Therefore, it will be assumed that 
there will be no definite directionality in the changes of preferences which, if 





























































































Hypothesis 9. This hypothesis will be a control hypothesis, attempting to 
confirm the general validity of our results. While most hypotheses predicted 
changes and discontinuities, some were about continuities, of the communist 
patterns. There is, however, a distinct group of values where we would 
expect strong continuities, without evoking a communist legacy. These are 
the ethical-stoic values of COURAGEOUS, HONEST, RESPONSIBLE, SELF- 
CONTROLLED and FRIENDSHIP. These values, especially the central moral 
values of HONEST and RESPONSIBLE, are so generally acknowledged in 
any contemporary society than one would expect no significance change in 
their selection in between any of the years. A fundamental overall stability in 
their selection is therefore a control for the reliability of the method 
employed.
Hypothesis 10. Finally, there is a group of well-defined values, the 
contemplative personalitv values of WISDOM, BEAUTY and INNER 
HARMONY that are related to the self and not to others, and possess an 
aesthetical rather than ethical element. For these, no coherent hypothesis can 
be formed based on the general hypotheses. It will therefore be assumed that 
changes in them, if at all happening, will not follow a consistent pattern, as 
opposed to all the other groups, but each of them will follow the pattern of 
those other group to which they are semantically closest. Thus, INNER 
HARMONY would behave as in general the values that are part of the 
dissident values; BEAUTY will be closest to the type of change characteristic 
of the hedonistic values, while WISDOM will move together with the 
intellectual values.
Results
Most of the results used for assessing the hypotheses are contained in Table 2. 
First of all it includes the average preferences for the 36 values in the six 
observation years. Second, in between the averages of neighbouring 
observations for a particular value, one, two or three stars appear if, 
according to two tailed t-tests, the changes in preferences between these two 
years were significant at the 0.05, 0.01 or 0.001 levels. Third, the significance 
levels for an analysis of variance for all six observations taken together are 
given. Finally, the last column of the Table indicates whether the changes 




























































































direction. Figures 3 and 4 represent the basic data separately for the IS 
terminal and instrumental values.
In the following first the operationalised hypotheses will be assessed, 
while the general hypotheses will be examined after.
Hypothesis 1. The first hypothesis, according to which 1989 should represent 
for all the classical socialist values a single and sustained break, is fully born 
out by the data. Concerning all three values of the classical socialist or social 
democratic value group, WORK, SOCIAL RECOGNITION and SELF- 
RESPECT, the average preference for each post-communist year is lower than 
for the communist period, and in almost all cases the difference is significant 
and even substantive. The same is true for the most classically socialist value 
of the official or ideological socialist value group, EQUALITY. In a way, the 
results are even clearer. The two values for which the break is the most 
pronounced, SOCIAL RECOGNITION and EQUALITY', are exactly the values 
that were semantically the closest to each other from the two different value 
groups. Thus, we could state that the receeding of the socialist value system is 
the strongest at the point of intersection of the classical and official socialist 
values.
Hypothesis 2. The behaviour of the two terminal values most associated with 
the communist regime, NATIONAL SECURITY and PEACE is also fully in 
line with the expected pattern. Their preference was highest in 1977-78 and 
1982, during the communist period, and in 1993, at the time of the post­
communist nostalgia. In 1990, however, there was a significant drop in 
importance, and the 1996 and 1997 averages returned to these levels. The 
hypothesis therefore that the reversal of 1993-94 was only temporary and that 
there is no continuity before and after 1989 at the level of the values most 
clearly associated with the former system stands confirmed.
Hypothesis 3. The twin hypothesis about the former dissident' values of the 
private sphere is also borne out by the data, with almost perfect geometrical 
precision. Whenever the official socialist values recede, the three values of 
FAMILY, INNER HARMONY and LOVE move forward, and whenever the 
former gain importance, the latter is weakened (see Figure 5). Concerning 
mere changes in numbers, we can only confirm the parallelism. However, 
concerning the meaning and the driving force of these changes, we can say 




























































































FAMILY, INNER HARMONY and LOVE are quite weak. In the American 
sample, they never belonged on the same pole of a factor (Rokeach 1973: 47). 
They were only brought together in Hungary bv their joint opposition to the 
socialist collective or public values. Therefore it can safely be assumed that 
the relative importance in their preference only follows and imitates the shifts 
in the official socialist values. The dynamism, the driving force behind these 
changes Lies solely with the socialist values — whether it is a matter of a gain 
or a loss of importance.
Hypothesis 4. The data also confirm basically our fourth operationalised 
hypothesis. Concerning both the most representative value of materialism, 
WELL-BEL\TG, and of hedonism, HAPPINESS, 1989 represented a once for all 
change. With this, not only the fourth hypothesis is confirmed, but also the 
entire geometrical pattern underlying the first four hypotheses. As Figures 5 
and 6 show, the decisive loss of importance of the classical socialist values can 
be contrasted by the strong and permanent gain in the basic materialistic and 
hedonistic values, while the more zig-zagged trajectory of the official public 
socialist values is mirrored by the opposite changes in the 'dissident' private 
values.
The second part of the hypothesis that assumed, in line with the first 
general hypothesis, a lack of corresponding change in the instrumental values 
closest to material well-being, is also born out by the data. AMBITIOUS, the 
instrumental value that both semantically and according to the results of the 
American data analysis is closest to the terminal value of WELL-BEING, 
failed to gain any importance in the post-communist years.
However, the data revealed a further characteristic of the changes that 
was not be predicted by the general hypothesis. Those hedonistic values that 
were less related to the blissful state of prosperity and contendedness (like 
WELL-BEING and HAPPINESS) but to a more active enjoyment of life (like 
PLEASURE, EXCITING LIFE and BEAUTY - the contrast is especially marked 
if the bracketed descriptions in the original value form are compared; see 
Appendix) remained more or less stable until 1996, and only changed in the 
last observation year. Thus, a mentality concerning the image of future as a 
blissful state of happiness lying just ahead was preserved, though instead of 
the socialist values, this state was now associated with comfort and material 





























































































This change gains further importance when contrasted with 
corresponding losses in those two values that semantically belong here and 
that were among the very few values for which the changes between 1996 and 
1997 proved to be significant. These are AMBITIOUS and especially WORK, 
the value for which the change was by far the most dramatic. During this one- 
year period, the average ranking of WORK lost 1.5 points. This is a huge loss 
in itself, and becomes even more drastic if one adds that there were no other 
terminal or instrumental values for which the change between 1996 and 1997 
would exceed 0.5 points, and that it came on top of an already substantial loss 
of importance as compared to the pre-1989 levels. Thus, while WORK as a 
terminal value was the fifth most important during the communist period, by 
1997, as compared to 1977-78, in a series of almost linear successions it lost 3.5 
average ranking points and became one of the least important values by 1997 
(the 14th among the 18 terminal values).
One could argue that this change only represents a reaction against the 
socialist regime and the excessive importance attributed there to work and 
production, as opposed to consumption. This is certainly true, but is only part 
of the story. The true relevance of this result, however, can be rendered 
visible from the perspective of Max Weber's sociology, especially his ideas 
concerning 'innerworldly asceticism' (Weber 1978: 542). According to Weber, 
ascetic religions and life-conducts appear in unsettled periods of transition, 
where they provide inner stability and reinforcement for individuals given 
the conditions, and also are conducive to consolidation and reconstruction at 
the societal level. This is particularly true in so far as the emergence of 
modern market capitalism is concerned. The drastic loss of importance in the 
value of W'ORK, as shown by the data, illustrates with particularly poignancy 
the difficulties of post-communism. The problem is not only to overcome the 
omnipresent weight of the past, but that its failures directly prejudicate the 
possibility of success in the present. These are not only the socialist values 
that are compromised, but the communist regime managed to compromise 
those very values that are vital for reconstruction and renovation after 
communism.
Hypothesis 5. Given the huge differences between the Hungarian and 
American averages in the pilot study, and the theoretically argued connection 
between intellectual values and the official socialist value order, the extent of 
a possible dislocation in these values possessed special interest concerning 




























































































strongly support the continuity thesis at this hidden level. Far from receding, 
LOGICAL and especially INTELLECTUAL even gained importance after 
1989. The high degree of underlying intellectualisation of the Hungarian 
value system continued unaltered after 1989.
The data also confirmed the two minor hypotheses. The year in which 
there was an exceptionally high preference for intellectual values was indeed 
1993. In that year, the intellectualisation of the Hungarian value system was 
so thorough that INTELLECTUAL became the single most important 
instrumental value in Hungary, more important even than the basic ethical 
values of HONEST, RESPONSIBLE and COURAGEOUS, while LOGICAL 
ranked 7th (to recall, INTELLECTUAL and LOGICAL were ranked 15th and 
17th in the US sample). By 1996, together with the running out of steam of the 
nostalgia for the former regime, all three intellectual values resumed their 
former level. In 1997, however, there was another a gain in importance, 
almost reaching significance with INTELLECTUAL and definitely with 
LOGICAL. This change can also be paired with the increase in hedonism. The 
importance of CAPABLE, just as that of INDEPENDENT, however, remained 
unchanged.
Hypothesis 6. The results for the sixth hypothesis are fairly straightforward. 
While some studies documented a spectacular rise in the importance of 
religion in other East-European countries like Russia (Greeley 1994), nothing 
similar has happened in Hungary. Salvation remained by far the least 
important terminal value in Hungary, and there were no changes after 1989 
as compared to the 1982 level.
Hypothesis 7. The blend of continuity and discontinuity suggested in this 
case, derived from the four general hypotheses, is again confirmed by the 
data. The low preference granted to the two interpersonal values, 
FORGIVING and LOVING, was persistently maintained after 1989. In fact, 
the first is one of the few values where, according to the ANOVA test, there 
were no significant movements at all during the entire 20-year period, while 
this is almost true for the second as well, if we consider 1982 as an outlier 
case. The third value of the group, HELPFUL, the only one that was preferred 
more in Hungary than in the US as this was a value of interpersonal relations 
that not only had religious and communitarian but also socialist connotations, 



























































































loss of importance between 1977 and 1997 was by far the greatest, the most 
consistent and linear exactly in this case.
Hypothesis 8. It was assumed that to be OBEDIENT, CLEAN and POLITE are 
results of the civilising process that in a modem society are more or less taken 
for granted, and therefore changes in their importance merely follow changes 
in those values with which they are positively or negatively correlated. The 
actual data concerning these values did not contain anything counter­
intuitive. In their selection, 1989 did not introduce any break. In fact, the 
changes between 1982 and 1990 were the smallest as compared to any other 
neighbouring observation years for these three values. The shifts from one 
year to another after 1989, on the other hand, as shown by Figure 7, strictly 
followed the oscillations in the preference for their semantic opposites, the 
intellectual values — movements which, on their own, were reduced to 
positive and negative communist legacies: the nostalgic return towards the 
past in 1993, and the two-step intensification of materialism and hedonism in 
1990 and in 1997.
Hypothesis 9. In this control hypothesis, it w'as assumed that amidst all these 
changes and the legacies of the communist past, a fundamental continuity 
should be shown by a series of values that belong to the moral basics in any 
modern society, like COURAGEOUS, SELF-CONTROLLED, FRIENDSHIP, 
and especially HONEST and RESPONSIBLE. This hypothesis again worked 
quite well (see also Figure 8). Out of the five values that remained 
consistently stable through the twenty observation years, three belonged to 
this group, including the two most important ethical values, HONEST and 
RESPONSIBLE. Even further, there is only one outlier year for SELF- 
CONTROLLED, 1982, and from 1977-78 up to 1993, there was no change in 
the preference for COURAGEOUS either. Thus, one could say that in so far as 
expressed preferences for moral values are concerned, neither the communist 
regime, nor its collapse left a trace on the value system of Hungary. 
Confirming our expectations, the communist legacy is to be searched neither 
at the surface of consciousness, the explicit life-goals, nor at the moral basics, 
but at the level of the taken for granted structures of the conduct of life, or the 
habitus.
Hypothesis 10. The semantically homogenous set of personality values, with 




























































































or - to a less extent - the hedonistic values, might have represented the core of 
an alternative, independent lifestyle, opposed to both the direct and indirect 
effects of the past regime. It was assumed, however, that this would not be 
the case, and changes in the individual values would simply mirror shifts in 
those other value groups with which these values showed some affinity. This 
hypothesis was also confirmed to a large extent, though with a major and 
important exception. Most conform to expectations was the behaviour of 
INNER HARMONY that simply followed the oscillations of the other 
'dissident' values. BEAUTY certainly did not move together with INNER 
HARMONY, as in 1990 there was a significant, though not very huge and 
rather puzzling, decline in its importance. The other clear change in its 
preference happened between 1996 and 1997 when, as part of a general shift 
toward hedonism, BEAUTY also became somewhat more important.
The third value of the group, WISDOM, followed again a completely 
different pattern. However, this finding is important, and is perhaps the most 
promising sign in the otherwise rather depressing picture. This value was one 
of the three almost completely neglected values in Hungary in 1977-78 — a 
neglect that was one of the strongest contrast between the Hungarian and 
American value preferences. However, through a series of significant, 
substantial and linear shifts, by 1997 WISDOM gained more than two average 
ranking points (by far the greatest gain of all 18 terminal values), and took up 
a respectful place in the overall ranking, leaving behind the marginal position 
it occupied in 1977-78. Such a considerable gain in importance is especially 
relevant in light of the paternalism of the former regime and the degree of 
infantilism (Hankiss 1982) produced by it.
The steady progress of WISDOM can be further illustrated by 
contrasting it with the decline of WORK. As Figure 9 demonstrates, the 
slightest movement in the preference of one of the values is prefectly 
mirrored in an opposite and equal shift in the other throughout the entire 20- 
year span. Such a conflict or competition between these two values is all the 
stranger as in the first principal component of the American sample, they 
appear together on the same pole. Thus, it seems that the spectacular rise in 
the importance of WISDOM was to a large extent a compensation for the 





























































































Given that most of the ten operationalised hypotheses were supported by the 
data, it is not surprising that the four general hypotheses, on the basis of 
which the former were constructed for the single value sets, were also met. A 
quick glance at Figures 3 and 4 immediately shows that the changes between 
the pre- and post-1989 years were much greater for the terminal then for the 
instrumental values. The variations in the latter were more in the form of 
oscillations, while preference for most of the terminal values did change in a 
definite direction. This perception can be confirmed by a series of t-tests. If we 
compare changes between 1977 and 1997, then the identity of the average can 
be rejected at the 0.01 significance level for 14 of the 18 terminal values, and 
only for 7 of the 18 instrumental values, while the null-hypothesis of identity 
can be accepted at the 0.05 level only for two terminal values, and for all the 
other 11 instrumental values.
Concerning the other three general hypotheses, we could only repeat 
ourselves, as for every single value associated positively or negatively with 
the socialist project 1989 represented a single break; for every value similarly 
linked to the official ideology of the regime the same was true, though with a 
smaller difference and with a temporary reversal in 1993; while an increase 
materialism and hedonism indeed proved to be the only new development 
counterbalancing with the loss of the socialist values. With the exception of 
WISDOM, there were no values showing relevant and unpredicted change.
Concluding remarks
This paper tested a series of general and specific hypotheses concerning 
changes in the value preferences in Hungary over a span of 20 years, using a 
highly complex and sophisticated value test. Yet, the majority of the 
hypotheses were smoothly confirmed, and these covered almost all the 
significant changes that occured in 36 basic human values in six different 
samples. Such a high degree of predictability almost looks suspicious.
Yet, we would argue that the explanation does not lie with the data or 
the methods, neither is it an artifact of post hoc analysis. It is rather that the 
changes ultimately can be reduced not simply to ten operational hypotheses, 
not even to four general hypotheses, but a single overarching assertion. In the 
value preferences of Hungary during the past twenty years, there was only 



























































































derived, as if following a domino principle, and that was the collapse of the 
socialist project and the corresponding dissolution of communist power.
The socialist value system had two different though interlaced 
components, the classical and the official socialist values. By 1990, the 
preference for both sets decreased considerably. This was clearly a sign of the 
collapse of existing socialism. This phenomenon, however, also defined the 
direction and the modality of the opposite movements. The values that 
gained in importance were the opposites of these two value sets. The 
opposites of the classical socialist values were the values of materialism and 
hedonism that indeed immediately gained considerable importance in 1990. 
But if the direction of this change was clearly opposed to socialism, its 
modality was defined by the collapsed regime, just as the existing socialist 
project promised a blissful state in the bright communist future, the changes 
were accompanied in 1990 in a similar naive belief in the sudden panacea: 
well-being, comfortable life, happiness and contentedness. Similarly, the 
official socialist values were opposed by a series of dissident values that 
similarly gained importance in 1990.
The changes between 1990 and 1993 can almost completely be 
subsumed under the return of the rejected, the temporary nostalgia for the 
former regime. This implied no change in the first component analysed 
above, the contrast between classical socialism and hedonist materialism, but 
led to an almost full-scale reversal with respect to the second component, 
with both the official socialist and the dissident values returning, or at least 
approaching, the pre-1989 level of preferences. This time it was followed by 
an increased preference for another indirect impact of the former regime, the 
strong intellectualisation in the instrumental values, that was compensated by 
a mirror movement in the traditional disciplinary values that were the 
opposite pole of the intellectual values.
By 1996 at the latest, the post-communist bandwagon ran out of steam. 
This meant that the values belonging to the second component of communist 
and anti-communist value sets all returned to their 1990 levels. As a matter of 
fact, the similarity between the 1990 and the 1996 averages is striking, with 
hardly any significant difference. But it also means that by 1996, the two- 
headed socialist value groups, with their adherents and opponents, still ruled 
changes in the value preferences.
Even by 1997, there was little change in this regard. The only 
significant and marked difference, the intensification of hedonism and the 



























































































even if adding some colour to the blank bliss of 1990, and certainly gave no 
indication concerning the emergence of a coherent new set of values that 
could show a way out of the situation.
In this rather bleak picture, there is, however, one ray of hope, at least 
according to our data. This concerns the spectacular rise in importance of 
WISDOM. WISDOM is certainly a value that is much needed in the post- 
communist countries. However, it remains to be seen whether an increased 
attention paid to this most classical, and most reflexive, of all values can serve 
as the starting point of a development that could help the country to spin out 




























































































(1) This view was voiced in the most influential manner in the well-known 
works by Vaclav Havel, Gyorgv Konrad and Adam Michnik about 
'civil society'.
(2) Such views were expressed in the same countries by similarly leading 
intellectual figures like Milan Kundera, Gyula Iliyas or Czeslaw 
Milosz.
(3) For references on some prior empirical studies on values, see a study of 
values done in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s (McGregor 1991), and in 
Poland in 1978 (Kohn et al. 1997).
(4) For further details, see also Fiistbs and Szakolczai (1994) and 
Szakolczai and Fiistos (1998).
(5) There has been some discussion concerning the ranking or rating of 
values (Krosnick and Alwin 1988, Suhonen 1985). Both present their 
own methodological complications, ipsativity (ranking) or the presence 
of a g-factor (rating). Rokeach required the ranking of both sets from 1 
to 18. This, however, rendered the test quite complicated and time- 
consuming. Schwartz onlv asked respondents to rate his set of 56 
values developed on the basis of the Rokeach test from -1 (opposed to 
my values) to 7 (of supreme importance) (Schwartz and Bardi 1997: 
395). Though it is clear that the results yielded by both methods cannot 
be very different (Alwin and Krosnick 1985, Miethe 1985), ranking is 
required from the perspective of the theoretical considerations 
elaborated in this paper, and are also more suited for further, in-depth 
statistical analysis.
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A p p e n d i x .  T h e  R o k e a c h  v a l u e  t e s t
A. Terminal values
1. A COMFORTABLE LIFE * (a prosperous life)
* (In Hungary: MATERIAL WELL-BEING)
2. A WORLD OF PEACE (free of war and conflict)
3. HAPPINESS (contentedness)
4. WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)
5. FAMILY SECURITY (taking care of the loved ones)
6. INNER FLARMONY (freedom from inner conflict)
7. EQUALITY (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all)
8. A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT * (lasting contribution)
* (In Hungary: THE SATISFACTION OF WELL-DONE WORK)
9. AN EXCITING LIFE (a stimulating, active life)
10. NATIONAL SECURITY (protection from attack)
11. TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close companionship)
12. MATURE LOVE (sexual and spiritual intimacy)
13. PLEASURE (an enjoyable, leisurely life)
14. SELF-RESPECT (self-esteem)
15. FREEDOM (independence, free choice)
16. A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the art)
17. SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, admiration)
18. SALVATION (saved, eternal life)
B. Instrumental values
19. IMAGINATIVE (daring, creative)
20. COURAGEOUS (standing up for your beliefs)
21. BROADMINDED (open-minded)
22. OBEDIENT (dutiful, respectful)
23. INTELLECTUAL (intelligent, reflexive)
24. SELF-CONTROLLED ’ (restrained, self-disciplined)
* (In Hungary: DISCIPLINED)
25. RESPONSIBLE (dependable, reliable)
26. CAPABLE (competent, effective)
27. CHEERFUL (lighthearted, joyful)
28. LOGICAL (consistent, rational)
29. FORGIVING (willing to pardon others)
30. INDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient)
31. HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others)
32. HONEST (sincere, truthful)
33. LOVING (affectionate, tender)
34. CLEAN (neat, tidy)
35. AMBITIOUS (hard-working, aspiring)
36. POLITE (courteous, well-mannered)
- Note: in three cases, the re-translation of the word used in the Hungarian 




























































































Table 1. The first principal component





























1968 1978 1982 1990
.49 .58 .57 .63
.57 .47 .55 .60
.27 .35 .48 .56
.52 .32 .31 .43
.20 .34 .47 .19
.37 .42 .21 .28
.19 .33 .26 .21
.23 .36 .37 .18
.31 .10 .08 -.04
.23 .01 .04 -.02
.46 .03 .14 .07
.29 .42 .24 .11
.04 .23 .24 -.16
.06 .38 .26 -.13
-.15 .33 .22 -.20
.05 .24 .13 .02
-.29 -.30 -.24 .09
-.27 -.39 -.27 .06
-.34 -.40 -.31 -.07
-.44 -.40 -.43 -.19
-.24 -.26 -.33 -.41
-.25 -.21 -.19 -.45
-.39 -.45 -.42 -.45
-.55 -.48 -.48 -.41
-.49 -.46 -.49 -.43
-.39 -.53 -.52 -.49
-.38 -.53 -.53 -.57
















.07 - .36 -.33
.19 -.17 -.21
- .06 .11 .26
-.14 .17 .41
-.24 .13 .01




































































































Table 2. Changes in the averaee rankine for each i/alue
1978 1982 1990 1993 199o 1997 ANOVA linearity
1. WELL-BEING 8.2 8 .7 " '* 6.8 6.5 6.5 6.8 .001 ,«u
2. PEACE 4.4* ** 3.9** * 4.9**’* 3 .7 " * 4.8 4.9 .001 .«n
3. HAPPINESS 6.9* ■* 7.6 *** 6.0 6.2 5.9 5.9 .001 .« h
4. WISDOM 13.1 '1 12.7*"' 12.2*** 11.3 1 1 .4 " 11.0 .001 .«n
5. FAMILY SEC. 5.2 5 .3 " ’* 3.9 *** 4.6 " '* 3.8 3.7 .001 .«n
6. INNER HARMONY 8.9 8 .7 " ’* 7 5 " * 8 .4 " '* 7.6 7.4 .001 .«n
7. EQUALITY 9.4 9.1 " *11.2" * 10.7 11.0 11.1 .«11 .«ii
8. WORK 7.7*'** 8.2 *'** 8 .7 " '* 9.8 9.7*** 11.2 .001 .001
9. EXCITING LIFE 11.7 11.9 11.7 11.9 12.0" * 11.5 Note 1 n.s.
10. NATIONAL SECURITY 7.4 ** 6.8*
SO>o00 '* 8.0 7.9 .001 .« h
11. TRUE FRIENDSHIP 9.4 ** 8.9 9.2 9.1 9.0 9.1 n.s. n.s.
12. MATURE LOVE 10.3 * 10.7*'** 9.7**'110.6 *'110.0 10.3 .001 n.s.
13. PLEASURE 11.8 11.9 11.6 * 12.0 11.9" “ 11.3 Note 1 Note 1
14. SELF-RESPECT 9.6 9.6 *’ 9.9" *1 0 5 * 10.1 10.0 .001 .001
15. FREEDOM 8.7 8.8 9.1 9.0 *'1 9.4 9.6 .001 .001
16. BEAUTY 13.9 13.6 ** 14.2 14.0 14.1" * 13.6 .001 n.s.
17. SOCIAL RECOGNITION 8.8 * 9.2** * 11.1*"■10.5 10.6 10.5 .001 .«ii
18. SALVATION 15.8 155 15.4 15.7** * 15.2 15.4 .001 .«ii
19. IMAGINATIVE 10.9 10.9 1 0 .7 " 10.1" * 10.9 10.7 Note 2 n.s.
20. COURAGEOUS 7.2 7.4 7.3 7.4 * 7.8 7.8 Note 3 Note 3
21. BROADMINDED 10.4 * 9 .9 " ’* 10.7 10.4 10.4 10.7 .001 .«n
22. OBEDIENT 10.9 10.5*"' 11.1 * 11.6*** 11.0 11.2 .001 .001
23. INTELLECTUAL 8.3* ** 7.6 7.4 *** 6 .4 *" ' 7.4 7.0 .«11 .001
24. SELF-CONTROLLED 9.2* ** 8.2 " ’* 9.1 9.0 9.3 9.0 Note 2 Note 2
25. RESPONSIBLE 6.9 * 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.1 6.8 n.s. n.s.
26. CAPABLE 11.4 11.6 11.4 11.2 11.3 11.3 n.s. n.s.
27. CHEERFUL 9.9 10.3 * 9.8 * 10.2 " ' 9.6 9.7 .001 .001
28. LOGICAL 10.9"’* 10.3 10.2**'' 9.3* ** 10.9**'■ 10.0 .001 n.s.
29. FORGIVING 11.0 11.2 11.2 11.4 11.1 10.9 n.s. n.s.
30. INDEPENDENT 9.1" *10.1 * 9.7 10.0 " ' 9.4 9.1 .001 .«ii
31. HELPFUL 7.9*"  8.7 9.0 9.2 9.1 9.3 .001 .001
32. HONEST 6.7 6.4 6.5 6.7 6.4 6.6 n.s. n.s.
33. LOVING 10.2"’* 11.0**’* 10.0 10.2 10.3 10.1 Note 4 Note 4
34. CLEAN 10.0*** 9.2 9.4 9.7** * 8.8 " ' 9.4 .001 n.s.
35. AMBITIOUS 9.5" * 10.8 10.5 10.8 10.8 11.2 .001 .«n
36. POLITE 10.8*** 9.8 9.7*** 10.4 *** 9.6 ** 10.2 .001 n.s.
The lower the average ranking, the greater is the relative importance of the value 
Stars between columns indicate a significant change between two years
- * significant at the 0.05 level;
- ** significant at the 0.01 level;
- *** significant at the 0.001 level;
ANOVA test indicates significance of overall change for the six observation years
- n.s. means not significant;
- Note 1: n.s. if 1997 is omitted;
- Note 2: n.s. if 1993 is omitted;
- Note 3: n.s. if 1996 and 1997 are omitted;
- Note 4: n.s. if 1982 is omitted;
linearity test indicates where the changes in between observations have a directionality, 
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